~Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s 5th Prime Minister, 1968
“In June 1967, we again had a chance. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
~Menachem Bagin, 6th Israeli prime Minister, 1982
“I know how at least 80 percent of the incidents with Syria started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent … It would go like this: we would send a tractor to plow … in the demilitarized area, and we would know ahead of time that the Syrians would start shooting. If they did not start shooting, we would inform the tractor to progress further, until the Syrians, in the end, would get nervous and would shoot. And then we would use guns, and later, even air force, and that is how it went…. We thought … that we could changes the lines of the cease-fire by military actions that were less then war. That is, to seize some territory and hold it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us.” (Finkelstein, Image)
~Moshe Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister, 1976
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